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Abstract
We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the ef-
ficiency of the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme proposed by
Bennett and Brassard. We also prove the security of our modified
scheme against the most general eavesdropping attack that is allowed
by the laws of physics. The first major ingredient of our scheme is
the assignment of significantly different probabilities to the different
polarization bases during both transmission and reception, thus reduc-
ing the fraction of discarded data. A second major ingredient of our
scheme is a refined analysis of accepted data: We divide the accepted
data into various subsets according to the basis employed and esti-
mate an error rate for each subset separately. We then show that such
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a refined data analysis guarantees the security of our scheme against
the most general eavesdropping strategy, thus generalizing Shor and
Preskill’s proof of security of BB84 to our new scheme. Up till now,
most proposed proofs of security of single-particle type quantum key
distribution schemes have relied heavily upon the fact that the bases
are chosen uniformly, randomly and independently. Our proof removes
this symmetry requirement.
Keywords: Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution
1 Introduction
Since an encryption scheme is only as secure as its key, key distribution is
a big problem in conventional cryptography. Public-key based key distribu-
tion schemes such as the Diffie-Hellman scheme [19] solve the key distribution
problem by making computational assumptions such as that the discrete log-
arithm problem is hard. However, unexpected future advances in algorithms
and hardware (e.g., the construction of a quantum computer [53, 54]) may
render many public-key based schemes insecure. Worse still, this would lead
to a retroactive total security break with disastrous consequences. This is
because an eavesdropper may save a message transmitted in the year 2003
and wait for the invention of a new algorithm/hardware to decrypt the mes-
sage decades later. A big problem in conventional public-key cryptography
is that there is, in principle, nothing to prevent an eavesdropper with infinite
computing power from passively monitoring the key distribution channel and
thus successfully decoding any subsequent communication.
Recently, there has been much interest in using quantum mechanics in
cryptography. (The subject of quantum cryptography was started by S. Wies-
ner [60] in a paper that was written in about 1970 but remained unpublished
until 1983. For reviews on the subject, see [6, 25, 46].) The aim of quantum
cryptography has always been to solve problems that are impossible from
the perspective of conventional cryptography. This paper deals with quan-
tum key distribution [4, 11, 21] whose goal is to detect eavesdropping using
the laws of physics.1 In quantum mechanics, measurement is not just a pas-
1Another class of applications of quantum cryptography has also been proposed [5, 12].
Those applications are mainly based on quantum bit commitment and quantum one-out-of-
two oblivious transfer. However, it is now known [48, 42, 41, 38] that unconditionally secure
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sive, external process, but an integral part of the formalism. Indeed, thanks
to the quantum no-cloning theorem [18, 61], passive monitoring of unknown
transmitted signals is strictly forbidden in quantum mechanics. Moreover,
an eavesdropper who is listening to a channel in an attempt to learn informa-
tion about quantum states will almost always introduce disturbance in the
transmitted quantum signals [7]. Such disturbance can be detected with high
probability by the legitimate users. Alice and Bob will use the transmitted
signals as a key for subsequent communications only when the security of
quantum signals is established (from the low value of error rate).
Although various QKD schemes have been proposed, the best-known one
is still perhaps the first QKD scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard and
published in 1984 [4]. Their scheme, which is commonly known as the BB84
scheme, will be briefly discussed in Section 3. Here it suffices to note two of its
characteristics. First, in BB84 each of the two users, Alice and Bob, chooses
for each photon between two polarization bases randomly (that is, the choice
of basis is a random variable), uniformly (that is, with equal probability)
and independently. For this reason, half of the times they are using different
basis, in which case the data are rejected immediately. Consequently, the
efficiency of BB84 is at most 50%. Second, a simple-minded error analysis
is performed in BB84. That is to say, all the accepted data (those that are
encoded and decoded in the same basis) are lumped together and a single
error rate is computed.
In contrast, in our new scheme Alice and Bob choose between the two
bases randomly, independently but not uniformly. In other words, the two
bases are chosen with substantially different probabilities. As Alice and Bob
are now much more likely to be using the same basis, the fraction of discarded
data is greatly reduced, thus achieving a significant gain in efficiency. In
fact, we are going to show in this paper that the efficiency of our scheme can
be made asymptotically close to unity. (The so-called orthogonal quantum
cryptographic schemes have also been proposed. They use only a single basis
of communication and, according to Goldenberg, it is possible to use them
to achieve efficiencies greater than 50% [22, 36]. Since they are conceptually
rather different from what we are proposing, we will not discuss them here.)
Is the new scheme secure? If a simple-minded error analysis like the
quantum bit commitment and unconditionally secure quantum one-out-of-two oblivious
transfer are both impossible. Furthermore, other quantum cryptographic schemes such as
a general two-party secure computation have also been shown to be insecure [38, 41]. For
a review, see [17].
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one that lumps all accepted data together were employed, an eavesdropper
could easily break a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the predominant
basis. To ensure the security of our scheme, it is crucial to employ a refined
data analysis. That is to say, the accepted data are further divided into two
subsets according to the actual basis used by Alice and Bob and the error rate
of each subset is computed separately. We will argue in this paper that such
a refined error analysis is sufficient in ensuring the security of our improved
scheme, against the most general type of eavesdropping attack allowed by
the laws of quantum physics. This is done by using the technique of Shor and
Preskill’s proof [55] of security of BB84 — a proof that built on the earlier
work of Lo and Chau [44] and of Mayers [49].
Our scheme is worth studying for several reasons. First, unlike the
entanglement-based QKD scheme proposed by Lo and Chau in Ref. [44],
the implementation of our new scheme does not require a quantum com-
puter. It only involves the preparation and measurement of single photons
as in standard BB84. Second, none of the existing schemes based on non-
orthogonal quantum cryptography has an efficiency more than 50%. (We
shall say a few word on the so-called orthogonal quantum cryptography in
Section 6.) By showing in this paper that the efficiency of our new scheme
can be made asymptotically close to 100%, we know that QKD can be made
arbitrarily efficient. Our idea is rather general and can be applied to improve
the efficiency of some other existing single particle based QKD schemes such
as the six-state scheme[13, 40]). Note that the efficiency of quantum cryp-
tography is of practical importance because it may play an important role
in deciding the feasibility of practical quantum cryptographic systems in any
future application. Third, our scheme is one of the few QKD schemes whose
security have been rigorously proven. Finally, all previous proofs of security
seem to rely heavily on the fact that the two bases are chosen randomly and
uniformly. Our proof shows that such a requirement is redundant. Another
advantage of our security proof is that it does not depend on asymptotic
argument and hence can be applied readily to realistic situation involving
only a relatively small amount of quantum signal transmission.
The organization of our paper is as follows. The basic features and the
requirements of unconditional security will be reviewed in Section 2. In
Section 3, we will review the BB84 scheme and Shor-Preskill proof for com-
pleteness. Readers who are already familiar with the BB84 scheme and
Shor-Preskill proof may browse through Section 2 and skip Section 3. An
overview of our proof of security of an efficient QKD scheme will be given
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in Section 4, which is followed by Section 5 which ties up some loose ends.
Finally, we give some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Basic Features and Requirements of a
Quantum Key Distribution Scheme
2.1 basic procedure
The aim of a QKD scheme is to allow two cooperative participants (commonly
known as Alice and Bob) to establish a common secret key in the presence
of noise and eavesdropper (commonly known as Eve) by exploiting the laws
of quantum physics. More precisely, it is commonly assumed that Alice and
Bob share a small amount of initial authentication information. The goal
is then to expand such a small amount of authentication information into
a long secure key. In almost all QKD schemes proposed so far, Alice and
Bob are assumed to have access to a classical public unjammable channel as
well as a quantum noisy insecure channel. That is to say, we assume that
everyone, including the eavesdropper Eve, can listen to the conversations but
cannot change the message that send through the public classical channel.
In practice, an authenticated classical channel should suffice. On the other
hand, the transmission of quantum signal can be done through free air [3,
14, 34] or optical fibers [30, 50, 59] in practice. The present state-of-the-art
quantum channel for QKD can transmit signals up to a rate of 4×105 qubits
per second over a distance of about 10 km with an error rate of a few percent
[14, 30, 59].2 The quantum channel is assumed to be insecure. That is to say
that the eavesdropper is free to manipulate the signal transmitted through
the quantum channel as long as such manipulation is allowed by the known
laws of physics.
2In experimental implementations, coherent states with a Poisson distribution in the
number of photons are often employed. To achieve unconditional security, it is important
that the operational parameters are chosen such that the fraction of multi-photon signals
is sufficiently small. This may substantially reduce the key generation rate[33]. In the
current paper, we restrict our attention to perfect single photon signals as assumed in
standard BB84 and various security proofs.
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Using the above two channels, procedures in all secure QKD schemes we
know of to date can be divided into the following three stages:
1. Signal Preparation And Transmission Stage: Alice and Bob separately
prepare a number of classical and quantum signals. They may keep
some of them private and transmit the rest to the other party using
the secure classical and insecure quantum channels. They may iterate
the signal preparation and transmission process a few times.
2. Signal Quality Check Stage: Alice and Bob then (use their private in-
formation retained in the signal preparation and transmission stage,
the secure classical channel and their own quantum measurement ap-
paratus to) test the fidelity of their exchanged quantum signals that
have just been transmitted through the insecure and noisy quantum
channel. Since a quantum measurement is an irreversible process some
quantum signals are consumed in this signal quality check stage. The
aim of their test is to estimate the noise and hence the upper bound
for the eavesdropping level of the channel from the sample of quantum
signals they have measured. In other words, the process is conceptually
the same as a typical quantity control test in a production line — to
test the quality of products by means of destructive random sampling
tests. Alice and Bob abort and start all over again in case they believe
from the result of their tests that the fidelity of the remaining quan-
tum signal is not high enough. Alice and Bob proceed to the final stage
only if they believe from the result of their tests that the fidelity of the
remaining quantum signal is high.
3. Signal Error Correction and Privacy Amplification Stage: Alice and
Bob need to correct errors in their remaining signals. Moreover, they
would like to remove any residual information Eve might still have on
the signals. In other words, Alice and Bob would like to distill from
the remaining untested quantum signals a smaller set of almost perfect
signals without being eavesdropped or corrupted by noise. We call this
process privacy amplification. Finally, Alice and Bob make use of these
distilled signals to generate their secret shared key.
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2.2 security requirement
A QKD scheme is said to be secure if, for any eavesdropping strategy by Eve,
either a) it is highly unlikely that the state will pass Alice and Bob’s quality
check stage or b) with a high probability that Alice and Bob will share the
same key, which is essentially random and, furthermore, Eve has a negligible
amount of information on their shared key.3
3 Bennett and Brassard’s Scheme (BB84)
3.1 Basic idea of the BB84 scheme
We now briefly review the basic ingredients of the BB84 scheme and the
ideas behind its security. Readers who are already familiar with BB84 and
the Shor-Preskill proof may choose to skip this section to go directly to our
biased scheme in Section 4. In BB84 [4], Alice prepares and transmits to Bob
a batch of photons each of which is independently in one of the four possible
polarizations: horizontal (0◦), vertical (90◦), 45◦ and 135◦. For each photon,
Bob randomly picks one of the two (rectilinear or diagonal) bases to perform
a measurement. While the measurement outcomes are kept secret by Bob,
Alice and Bob publicly compare their bases. They keep only the polarization
data that are transmitted and received in the same basis. Notice that, in
the absence of noises and eavesdropping interference, those polarization data
should agree. This completes the signal preparation and transmission stage
of the BB84 scheme. We remark that the laws of quantum physics strictly
forbid Eve to distinguish between the four possibilities with certainty. This
is because the two polarization bases, namely rectilinear and diagonal, are
complementary observables and quantum mechanics forbids the simultane-
ous determination of the eigenvalues of complementary observables.4 More
3Naively, one might think that the security requirement should simply be: conditional
on passing the quality check stage, Eve has a negligible amount of information on the key.
However, such a strong security requirement is, in fact, impossible to achieve [49, 44]. The
point is that a determined eavesdropper can always replace all the quantum signals from
Alice by some specific state prepared by herself. Such a strategy will most likely fail in the
quality check. But, if it is lucky enough to pass, then Eve will have perfect information
on the key shared by Alice and Bob.
4Mathematically, observables in quantum mechanics are represented by Hermitian
matrices. Complementary observables are represented by non-commuting matrices and,
therefore, cannot be simultaneously diagonalized. Consequently, their simultaneous eigen-
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importantly, any eavesdropping attack will lead to a disagreement in the
polarization data between Alice and Bob, which can be detected by them
through public classical discussion. More concretely, to test for tampering
in the signal quality check stage, Alice and Bob choose a random subset of
the transmitted photons and publicly compare their polarization data. If
the quantum bit error rate (that is, the fraction of polarization data that
disagree) is unreasonably large, they throw away all polarization data and
start all over again. On the other hand, if the quantum bit error rate is
acceptably small, they should then move on to the signal error correction
and privacy amplification stage by performing public classical discussion to
correct remaining errors.
Proving security of a QKD scheme turned out to be a very tricky busi-
ness. The problem is that, in principle, Eve may have a quantum computer.
Therefore, she could employ a highly sophisticated eavesdropping attack by
entangling all the quantum signals transmitted by Alice. Moreover, she could
wait to hear the subsequent classical discussion between Alice and Bob during
both the signal quality check and the error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation stages before making any measurement on her system.5 One class of
proofs by Mayers [49] and subsequently others [9, 10] proved the security
of the standard BB84 directly. Those proofs are relatively complex. An-
other approach by Lo and Chau [39, 44] dealt with schemes that are based
on quantum error-correcting codes. It has the advantage of being concep-
tually simpler, but requires a quantum computer to implement. These two
classes of proofs have been linked up by the recent seminal work of Shor and
Preskill [55], who provided a simple proof of security of the BB84 scheme.
They showed that an eavesdropper is no better off with standard BB84 than
a QKD scheme based on a specific class of quantum error-correcting codes.
So long as from Eve’s view, Alice and Bob could have performed the key
generation by using their quantum computers, one can bound Eve’s infor-
mation on the key. It does not matter that Alice and Bob did not really use
quantum computers.
vectors generally do not exist.
5As demonstrated by the well-known Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, classical intu-
itions generally do not apply to quantum mechanics. This is a reason why proving security
of QKD is hard.
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3.2 entanglement purification
To recapitulate Shor and Preskill’s proof, we shall first introduce a QKD
scheme based on entanglement purification and prove its security. Our dis-
cussion in the next few subsections essentially combines those of Shor and
Preskill[55] and Gottesman and Preskill[28].6
Entanglement purification was first proposed by Bennett, DiVincenzo,
Smolin and Wootters (BDSW) [8]. Its application to QKD was first proposed
by Deutsch et al. [20]. A convincing proof of security based on entanglement
purification was presented by Lo and Chau [44]. Finally, Shor and Preskill[55]
noted its connection to BB84.
Suppose two distant observers, Alice and Bob, share n impure EPR pairs.
That is to say, some noisy version of the state
|Φ(n)〉 = |Φ+〉⊗n (1)
where |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉). They may wish to distill out a smaller number,
say k, pairs of perfect EPR pairs, by applying only classical communications
and local operations. This process is called entanglement purification [8].
Suppose they succeed in generating k perfect EPR pairs. By measuring the
resulting EPR pairs along a common axis, Alice and Bob can obtain a secure
k-bit key.
Of course, a quality check stage must be added in QKD to guarantee
the likely success of the entanglement purification procedure (for any eaves-
dropping attack that will pass the quality check stage with a non-negligible
probability). A simple quality check procedure is for Alice and Bob to take
a random sample of the pairs and measure each of them randomly along
6There are some subtle differences between the original Shor and Preskill’s proof and
the one elaborated by Gottesman and Preskill. First, in the original Shor and Preskill’s
proof, Alice and Bob apply a simple-minded error rate estimation procedure in which they
lump all polarization data of their test sample together into a single set and compute
a single bit error rate. In contrast, in Gottesman and Preskill’s elaboration, Alice and
Bob separate the polarization data according to the bases in which they are transmitted
and received. The two bit error rates for the rectilinear and diagonal bases are computed
separately. In essence, they are employing the refined data analysis idea, which was
first presented in a preliminary version of this manuscript [45]. Second, in Gottesman
and Preskill’s discussion, the final key is generated by measuring along a single basis,
namely the Z-basis. (Because of this prescription, they call the error rates of the two
bases simply bit-flip and phase errors. To avoid any potential confusion, we will not use
their terminology here.) In contrast, in Shor and Preskill’s original proof, the final key is
generated from polarization data obtained in both bases.
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either X or Z axis and compute the bit error rate (i.e., the fraction in which
the answer differs from what is expected from an EPR pair). Suppose they
find the bit error rates for the X and Z bases of the sample to be pX and
pZ respectively. For a sufficiently large sample size, the properties of the
sample provide good approximations to those of the population. Therefore,
provided that the entanglement purification protocol that they employ can
tolerate slightly more than pX and pZ errors in the two bases, we would expect
that their QKD scheme is secure. This point will be proven in subsequent
discussions in subsection 3.3.
Let us introduce some notations.
Definition: Pauli operators. We define a Pauli operator acting on n qubits
to be a tensor product of individual qubit operators that are of the form
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
and Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
For example, P = X ⊗ I ⊗ Y ⊗ Z is a Pauli operator.
We shall consider entanglement purification protocols that can be con-
veniently described by stabilizers[23, 24]. A stabilizer is an Abelian group
whose generators, Mi’s, are Pauli operators.
Consider a fixed but arbitrary [[n, k, d]] stabilizer-based quantum error-
correcting code (QECC). The notation [[n, k, d]] means that it encodes k
logical qubits into n physical qubits with a minimum distance d. As noted
in [8], the encoding and decoding procedure of Alice and Bob can be equiv-
alently described by a set of Pauli operators, Mi, with both Alice and Bob
measuring the same operator Mi. To generate the final key from the en-
coded qubits, Alice and Bob eventually apply a set of operators, say Z¯a,A
and Z¯a,B respectively, for a = 1, 2, · · · , k. In Shor and Preskill’s proof, all
Alice’s (Bob’s respectively) operators commute with each other.
If the n EPR pairs were perfect, Alice and Bob would obtain identical
outcomes for their measurements, Mi,A and Mi,B. Moreover, because of the
commutability of the operators, those measurements would not disturb the
encoded operations, Z¯a,A⊗ Z¯a,B, each of which will give +1 as its eigenvalue
for the state of n perfect EPR pairs. This is because measurements Z¯a,A and
Z¯a,B produce the same +1 or −1 eigenvalues.
What about n noisy EPR pairs? Suppose Alice and Bob broadcast their
measurement outcomes for Mi,A and Mi,B respectively. The product of their
measurement outcomes of Mi,A and Mi,B gives the error syndrome of the
state, which is now noisy. Since the original QECC can correct up to t ≡
⌊d−1
2
⌋ errors, intuitively, provided that the number of bit-flip and phase error
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errors are each less than t, Alice and Bob will successfully correct the state
to obtain the k encoded EPR pairs. Now, they can measure the encoded
operations Z¯a,A ⊗ Z¯a,B to obtain a secure k-bit key.
3.3 Reduction to Pauli strategy
Definition: Correlated Pauli strategy. Recall that a Pauli operator acting on
n qubits is defined to be a tensor product of individual qubit operators that
are of the form I, X, Y and Z. We define a correlated Pauli strategy, (Pi, qi),
to be one in which Eve applies only Pauli operators. That is to say that Eve
applies a Pauli operator Pi with a probability qi.
The argument in the last subsection is precise only for a specific class of
eavesdropping strategies, namely the class of correlated Pauli strategies. In
this case, the numbers of bit-flip and phase errors are, indeed, well-defined.
What about a general eavesdropping attack? In general, Alice and Bob’s
system is entangled with Eve’s system. Does it still make any sense to say
that Alice and Bob’s system has no more than t bit-flip errors and no more
than t phase errors? Surprisingly, it does. Instead of having to consider all
possible eavesdropping strategies by Eve, it turns out that it is sufficient to
consider the Pauli strategy defined above. In other words, one can assume
that Eve has applied some Pauli operators, i.e., tensor products of single-
qubit identities and Pauli matrices, on the transmitted signals with some
classical probability distribution. More precisely, it can be shown that the
fidelity of the recovered k EPR pairs is at least as big as the probability that
i) t or fewer bit-flip errors and ii) t or fewer phase errors would have been
found if a Bell-measurement had been performed on the n pairs.
Mathematically, the insight can be stated as the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (from [28, 55, 44]): Suppose Alice and Bob share a bipar-
tite state of n pairs of qubits and they execute a stabilizer-based entanglement
purification procedure that can be described by the measurement operators,
Mi, with both Alice and Bob measuring the same Mi. Suppose further that
the procedure leads to a [[n, k, d]] QECC which corrects t ≡ ⌊d−1
2
⌋ bit-flip
errors and also t phase errors. Then, the fidelity of the recovered state, after
error correction, as k EPR pairs
F ≡ 〈Φ¯(k)|ρR|Φ¯
(k)〉 ≥ Tr (ΠSρ) . (2)
Here, Φ¯(k) is the encoded state of k EPR pairs, ρR is the density matrix of
the recovered state after quantum error correction, ρ is the density matrix
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of the n EPR pairs before error correction and ΠS represents the projection
operator into the Hilbert space, called Hgood, which is spanned by Bell pairs
states that differ from n EPR pairs in no more than t bit-flip errors and also
no more than t phase errors.
Proof of Theorem 1:
One can regard ρ as the reduced density matrix of some pure state |Ψ〉SE
which describes the state of the system, S and an ancilla (the environment,
E, outside Alice and Bob’s control). Now, in the recovery procedure, Alice
and Bob couple some auxiliary reservoir, R, prepared in some arbitrary initial
state, |0〉R, to the system. Initially, let us decompose the pure state |Ψ〉SE ⊗
|0〉R into a “good” component and a “bad” component, where the good
component is defined as:
|Ψgood〉 = (ΠS ⊗ IER)|Ψ〉SE ⊗ |0〉R (3)
and the bad component is given by:
|Ψbad〉 = ((IS −ΠS)⊗ IER)|Ψ〉SE ⊗ |0〉R. (4)
Now, the recovery procedure will map the two components, |Ψgood〉 and
|Ψbad〉, unitarily into |Ψ
′
good〉 and |Ψ
′
bad〉. Since the recovery procedure works
perfectly in the subspace, Hgood, we have
|Ψ′good〉 = |Φ¯
(k)〉S ⊗ |junk〉ER. (5)
Let us consider the norm of the good component:
〈Ψ′good|Ψ
′
good〉 = 〈Ψgood|Ψgood〉
= Tr (ΠSρ) . (6)
Now, the fidelity of the final state as an k-EPR pairs is given by:
F = SER〈Ψ
′|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′〉SER (7)
= SER〈Ψ
′
good|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
good〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ
′
bad|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
bad〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ
′
good|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
bad〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ
′
bad|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
good〉SER (8)
12
= Tr (ΠSρ)
+ SER〈Ψ
′
bad|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
bad〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ
′
good|Ψ
′
bad〉SER
+ SER〈Ψ
′
bad|Ψ
′
good〉SER (9)
= Tr (ΠSρ)
+ SER〈Ψ
′
bad|
(
|Φ¯(k)〉S S〈Φ¯
(k)|
)
⊗ IER|Ψ
′
bad〉SER (10)
≥ Tr (ΠSρ) (11)
where the orthogonality of the states, |Ψ′good〉SER and |Ψ
′
bad〉SER, is used in
Eq. (10). Q.E.D.
3.4 quality check procedure
In the last subsection, we showed that, provided that a Bell measurement,
if had been performed, would have shown that the numbers of bit-flip errors
and phase errors are both no more than t, Alice and Bob will succeed in
generating a secure key. In reality, there is no way for two distant observers,
Alice and Bob, to verify such a condition directly. Fortunately, Alice and
Bob can perform some quality check procedure by randomly sampling their
pairs. We have the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 ([44], particularly, its supplementary notes VI):
Suppose Alice prepares N EPR pairs and sends a half of each pair to Bob via
a noisy channel (perhaps controlled by Eve). Alice and Bob may randomly
select m of those pairs and perform a random measurement along either the
X or the Z axis. Suppose, for the moment, that they compute the bit error
rates of the tested sample in the two bases separately, thus obtaining psampleX
and psampleZ . Then, these two error rates are good estimates of those of the
population (and therefore, also the remaining untested pairs). In particular,
one can apply classical random sampling theory to estimate confidence levels
for the error rates in the two bases for the population (and thus the untested
pairs).
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us summarize the overall strategy of the proof.
One imagines applying the mathematical operation of Bell measurements on
the N imperfect EPR pairs before the error correction procedure, but after
Eve’s eavesdropping. Consider the resulting state. It could have been ob-
tained by a different eavesdropping strategy on the part of Eve, which applies
13
Pauli operators to the N-EPR-pair state with some probability distribution.
Finally, it suffices to consider only this limited class of eavesdropping strate-
gies.
Let us consider the state of the N EPR pairs after Eve’s eavesdropping at-
tack. For each of the m tested pair along the Z-basis, consider the projection
operators, P i,z|| and P
i,z
anti−|| for the two coarse-grained outcomes (parallel and
anti-parallel) of the measurement performed on the i-th pair. Specifically,
P i,z|| = |00〉i 〈00|i + |11〉i 〈11|i
= |Φ+〉i 〈Φ
+|i + |Φ
−〉i 〈Φ−|i, (12)
P i,zanti−|| = |01〉i 〈01|i + |10〉i 〈10|i
= |Ψ+〉i 〈Ψ
+|i + |Ψ
−〉i 〈Ψ−|i, (13)
where |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
Similarly, for each of the m test pair along the X-axis, consider the pro-
jection operators, P k,x|| and P
k,x
anti−||, for the two coarse-grained outcomes (par-
allel and anti-parallel) of the measurement performed on the k-th tested pair.
Namely,
P k,x|| =
1
4
(|0〉k + |1〉k)⊗ (|0〉k + |1〉k)(〈0|k + 〈1|k)⊗ (〈0|k + 〈1|k)
+
1
4
(|0〉k − |1〉k)⊗ (|0〉k − |1〉k)(〈0|k − 〈1|k)⊗ (〈0|k − 〈1|k)
= |Φ+〉k 〈Φ
+|k + |Ψ
+〉k 〈Ψ
+|k, (14)
P k,xanti−|| =
1
4
(|0〉k + |1〉k)⊗ (|0〉k − |1〉k)(〈0|k + 〈1|k)⊗ (〈0|k − 〈1|k)
+
1
4
(|0〉k + |1〉k)⊗ (|0〉k − |1〉k)(〈0|k + 〈1|k)⊗ (〈0|k − 〈1|k)
= |Φ−〉k 〈Φ−|k + |Ψ−〉k 〈Ψ−|k. (15)
The above four equations clearly show that using local operations and
classical communications only (LOCCs), Alice and Bob can effectively per-
form a coarse-grained Bell’s measurement with these four projection opera-
tors.
Now, consider the operator, MB, which represents a complete measure-
ment along N -Bell basis. Since MB, P
i,x
|| , P
i,x
anti−||, P
k,z
|| and P
k,z
anti−|| all refer
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to a single basis (namely, the N -Bell basis), they clearly commute with each
other. Therefore, they can be simultaneously diagonalized. Thus, a pre-
measurement MB by say Eve will in no way change the outcome for P
i,x
|| ,
P i,xanti−||, P
k,z
|| and P
k,z
anti−||. Therefore, we may as well consider the case when
such a pre-measurement is performed. By doing so, we have reduced the
most general eavesdropping strategy to a restricted class that involves only
Pauli operators. Consequently, the problem of estimation of the error rates
of the two bases is classical. Q.E.D.
We emphasize that the key insight of Proposition 1 is the “commuting
observables” idea: Consider the set of Bell measurements, X⊗X and Z⊗Z,
on all pairs of qubits. All such Bell measurements commute with each other.
Therefore, without any loss of generality, we can assign classical probabilities
to their simultaneous eigenstates and perform classical statistical analysis.
This greatly simplifies the analysis.
More concretely, provided that total number of the EPR pairs goes to
infinity, the classical de Finetti’s theorem applies to the random test sample
of m pairs. Moreover, for a sufficiently large N , it is common in classical
statistical theory to assume a normal distribution and use it to estimate
the mean of the population and establish confidence levels. Therefore, with
a high confidence level, for the remaining untested pairs, the error rates
puntestedX < p
sample
X + ε and p
untested
Z < p
sample
Z + ε.
The next question is: how do the two error rates (for the X and Z
bases) relate to the bit-flip and phase errors in the underlying quantum error
correcting code? Suppose, as in our discussion so far, Alice and Bob generate
their final key by measuring along the Z-axis only. In this case, it should not
be hard to see that the bit-flip error has an error rate puntestedZ and the phase
error has an error rate puntestedX .
However, in BB84, it is common practice to allow Alice and Bob to gener-
ate the key by measuring each pair along either the X or Z-axis with uniform
probabilities. Mathematically, as discussed in [55, 40], this is equivalent to
Alice’s applying either i) a Hadamard transform or ii) an identity operator
to the qubit before sending it to Bob. Therefore, in this case, it should not
be too hard to see that the bit-flip error is given by the averaged error rate
(puntestedX + p
untested
Z )/2 of the two bases. Similarly, the phase error rate is
given by the same expression. For this reason, it is, in fact, unnecessary in
Shor and Preskill’s proof for Alice and Bob to compute the two error rates
separately. In other words, a simple-minded error analysis in which they
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lump all polarization data (from both rectilinear or diagonal bases) together
and compute a single sample bit error rate, call it esample is sufficient for the
quality check stage.
Now, suppose a QECC [[n, k, d]] is chosen such that the maximal tolerable
error rate, emax = t
n
≡ ⌊(d−1)/2⌋
n
> esample + ε. Then, for any eavesdropping
strategy that will pass the quality check stage with a non-negligible proba-
bility, it is most likely that the remaining untested n EPR pairs will have less
then t bit-flip errors and also less than t phase errors. Therefore, the error
correction will most likely succeed and Alice and Bob will share a k-EPR-pair
state with high fidelity.
The following theorem shows that once Alice and Bob share a high fidelity
k-EPR-pair state, then they can generate a key such that the eavesdropper’s
mutual information is very small.
Theorem 2 ([44]): Suppose two distant observers, Alice and Bob, share
a high fidelity k-EPR-pair state, ρ, such that 〈Φ(k)|ρ|Φ(k)〉 > 1 − δ where
δ ≪ 1 and they generate a key by measuring the state along say the Z-axis,
then the eavesdropper’s mutual information on the key is bounded by
S(ρ) < −(1−δ) log2(1−δ)−δ log2
δ
(22k − 1)
= δ×
(
1
loge 2
+ 2k + log2(1/δ)
)
+O(δ2).
(16)
Proof: Let us recapitulate the proof presented in Section II of supple-
mentary material of [44]. The proof consists of two Lemmas. Lemma A says
that high fidelity implies low entropy. Lemma B says that the entropy is a
bound to the eavesdropper’s mutual information with Alice and Bob.
More concretely, Lemma A says the following: If 〈Φ(k)|ρ|Φ(k)〉 > 1 − δ
where δ ≪ 1, then the von Neumann entropy satisfies S(ρ) < −(1−δ) log2(1−
δ)−δ log2
δ
(22k−1) . Proof of Lemma A: If 〈Φ
(k)|ρ|Φ(k)〉 > 1−δ, then the largest
eigenvalue of the density matrix ρ must be larger than 1− δ. Therefore, the
entropy of ρ is, bounded above by that of a density matrix, ρ0 = diag(1 −
δ, δ
(22k−1) ,
δ
(22k−1) , · · · ,
δ
(22k−1)), which has an entropy −(1 − δ) log2(1 − δ) −
δ log2
δ
(22k−1) .
Lemma B, which is a corollary of Holevo’s theorem [29], says the following:
Given any pure state φA′B′ of a system consisting of two subsystems, A
′ and
B′, and any generalized measurements X and Y onA′ andB′ respectively, the
entropy of each subsystem S(ρA′) (where ρA′ is the reduced density matrix,
TrB′|φA′B′〉〈φA′B′ |) is an upper bound to the amount of mutual information
between X ′ and Y ′.
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Now, Suppose Alice and Bob share a bipartite state ρAB of fidelity 1− δ
to k EPR pairs. By applying Lemma A, one shows that the entropy of ρAB
is bounded by S(ρ) < −(1− δ) log2(1− δ)− δ log2
δ
(22k−1) .
Let us now introduce Eve to the picture and consider the system con-
sisting of the subsystem, A′, of Eve and the subsystem, B′, of combined
Alice-Bob. (i.e., B′ = AB.) Let us consider the most favorable situation
for Eve where she has perfect control over the environment. In this case,
the overall (Alice-Bob-Eve) system wavefunction can be described by a pure
state, φA′B′ where Eve controls A
′ and the combined Alice-Bob controls B′.
By Lemma B, Eve’s mutual information with Alice-Bob’s system is bounded
by (1− δ) log2(1− δ)− δ log2
δ
(22k−1) . Q.E.D.
Remark 1: It is not too hard to see that Alice and Bob will most likely
share a common key that is essentially random in the above procedure.
Remark 2: Suppose we limit the eavesdropper’s information, Ieve, to be
less than ε, Theorem 2 shows that, as the length, k of the final key increases,
the allowed infidelity, δ, of the state must decrease at least as O(1/k).
3.5 reduction to BB84
Shor and Preskill considered a special class of quantum error correcting codes,
namely Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. They showed that a QKD that
employs an entanglement purification protocol (EPP) based on a CSS code
can be reduced to BB84. Let us follow their arguments in two steps.
3.5.1 from entanglement purification protocol to quantum error-
correcting code protocol
From the work of BDSW [8], it is well known that any entanglement purifica-
tion protocol with only one-way classical communications can be converted
into a quantum error-correcting code. Shor and Preskill applied this result to
an EPP-based QKD scheme. Let us recapitulate the procedure of an EPP-
based QKD scheme. Alice creates N EPR pairs and sends half of each pair to
Bob. She then measures the check bits and compares them with Bob. If the
error rate is not too high, Alice then measures Mi,A and publicly announces
the outcomes to Bob, who measures Mi,B. This allows Alice and Bob to cor-
rect errors and distill out k perfect EPR pairs. Alice and Bob then measure
Z¯a,A and Z¯a,B, the encoded Z operators, to generate the key.
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Note that, by locality, it does not matter whether Alice measures the
check bits before or after she transmits halves of EPR pairs to Bob. Similarly,
it does not matter whether Alice measures her syndrome (i.e., the stabilizer
elements, Mi,A) before or after the transmission. Now, if she measures her
check bits before the transmission, it is equivalent to choosing a random BB84
state, |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). If Alice measures her
syndromes before the transmission, it is equivalent to encoding halves of k
EPR pairs in an [[n, k, d]] QECC, CsA , and sending them to Bob, where CsA
is the corresponding quantum code for the syndrome, sA, she found.
Finally, suppose Alice measures her halves of the encoded k EPR pairs
before the transmission, it is equivalent to Alice preparing one of the 2k
mutually orthogonal codeword states in the quantum code, CsA, to represent
a k-bit key and sending the state to Bob. In summary, the above discussion
reduces a QKD protocol based on EPP to a QKD protocol based on a class
of [[n, k, d]] QECC, CsA’s.
3.5.2 from error-correcting protocol to BB84
So far, we have not specified which class of QECCs to employ. Notice that,
for a general QECC, the QECC protocol still requires quantum computers
to implement (for example, the operators Mi,A). Here comes a key insight
of Shor and Preskill: If one employs Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes
[15, 57], then the scheme can be further reduced to standard BB84, which
can be implemented without a quantum computer. CSS codes have the nice
property that the bit-flip and phase error correction procedures are totally
decoupled from each other. In other words, the error syndrome is of the
form of a pair (sb, sp) where, sb and sp are respectively the bit-flip and phase
error syndrome. Without quantum computers, there is no way for Alice and
Bob to compute the phase error syndrome, sp. However, this is not really a
problem because phase errors do not change the value of the final key, which
is all that Alice and Bob are interested in. For this reason, Alice and Bob
can basically drop the phase-error correction procedure.
Let us first introduce the CSS code. Consider two classical binary codes,
C1 and C2, such that,
{0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ F
n
2 , (17)
where F n2 is the binary vector space of the n bits and that both C1 and C
⊥
2 ,
the dual of C2, have a minimal distance, d = 2t+1, for some integer, t. The
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basis vectors of a CSS code, C, are:
v → |ψ(v)〉 =
1
|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
|v + w〉, (18)
where v ∈ C1. Note that, whenever v1 − v2 ∈ C2, they are mapped to
the same state. In fact, the basis vectors are in one-one correspondence
with the cosets of C2 in C1. The dimension of a CSS code is 2
k where
k = dim(C1)− dim(C2). In standard QECC convention, the CSS code is
denoted as an [[n, k, d]] QECC.
One can also construct a whole class of CSS codes, Cz,x, from C, where
the basis vectors of Cz,x are of the form
v → |ψ(v)z,x〉 =
1
|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
(−1)x·w|v + w + z〉, (19)
where v ∈ C1.
7
Let us introduce some notation. Recall the definition of Pauli matrices.
The operator σx corresponds to a bit-flip error, σz a phase error and σy a
combination of both bit-flip and phase errors. It is convenient to denote the
Pauli operator acting on the k-th qubit by σa(k) where, a ∈ {x, y, z}. Given
a binary vector s ∈ F n2 , let
σ[s]a = σ
s1
a(1) ⊗ σ
s2
a(2) ⊗ · · ·σ
sn
a(n). (20)
By definition, the eigenvalues of σ[s]a are +1 and −1.
Let H1 be the parity check matrix for the code C1 and H2 be the par-
ity check matrix for C⊥2 . For each row, r ∈ H1, consider an operator, σ
[r]
z .
Applying to a quantum state, their simultaneous eigenvalues give the bit-flip
error syndrome. For each row, s ∈ H2, consider an operator, σ
[s]
x . Applying
to a quantum state, their simultaneous eigenvalues give the phase error syn-
drome. For instance, when applied to the state, ψ(v) in Eq. (19), we find the
bit-flip error syndrome, sb, and the phase error syndrome, sp to be:
sb = H1(z), sp = H2(x). (21)
7Note that our notation is different from both Refs. [55] and [28] in that we have
interchanged x and z in Eq. (19) as well as in the definition of Cz,x. In our notation, z
denotes the bit-flip error syndrome and x denotes the phase error syndrome.
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Let us look at the QECC-based QKD scheme as a whole. Alice is sup-
posed to pick a random vector v ∈ C1, random xA and zA and encode it as
|ψ(v)zA,xA〉. After Bob’s acknowledgement of his receipt of the state, Alice
then announces the values of xA and zA to Bob. Bob measures the state and
obtains his own syndrome, the values of xB and zB. The relative syndrome,
the values of xA×xB and zA×zB , is the actual error syndrome of the channel.
Bob then corrects the errors and measures along the z-axis to obtain a string
v +w + zA for some w ∈ C2. He then subtracts xA to obtain v +w. Finally,
Bob applies the generator matrix8, G2, of the dual code C
⊥
2 (i.e., the parity
check matrix of the code C2) to generate the key,
G2(v + w) = G2(v) +G2(w) = G2(v). (22)
Notice that the key is in one-one correspondence with the coset C2 in C1
because of the mapping G2(v)→ v + C2.
9
Here comes the key point: Since Bob measures along the z-axis to gen-
erate the key, the phase errors really do not change the value of the key.
Therefore, it is not necessary for Alice to announce the phase error syn-
drome, xA, to Bob. Therefore, without affecting the security of the scheme,
Alice is allowed to prepare a state ψ(v)zA,xA and then discard, rather than
broadcast the value of xA. Equivalently, she is allowed to prepare an averaged
state ψ(v)zA,xA over all values of xA. The averaging operation destroys the
phase coherence and, from Eq. (19), leads to a classical mixture of |v+w+zA〉
in the z-basis.
As a whole, the error correction/privacy amplification procedure for the
resulting BB84 QKD scheme goes as follows: Alice sends |u〉 to Bob through
a quantum channel. Bob obtains u + e due to channel errors. Alice later
broadcasts u + v, for a random v ∈ C1. Bob subtracts it from his received
string to obtain v + e. He corrects the errors using the code C1 to obtain a
codeword, v ∈ C1. He then applies the matrix, G2, to generate the final key
G2(v), which is in one-one correspondence with a coset of C2 in C1.
Remark 3: Upon reduction from CSS code to BB84, the original bit-flip
error correction procedure of C1 becomes a classical error correction proce-
dure. On the other hand, the phase error correction procedure becomes a
privacy amplification procedure. (And, it is achieved by extracting the coset
of C2 in C1 by using the generator matrix, G2, of the dual code C
⊥
2 .)
8Gottesman and Preskill’s paper stated that the parity check matrix, H2, of the dual
code C⊥
2
should be used. But, it should really be the generator matrix.
9This is a well-known result in classical coding theory.
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Remark 4: Note that the crux of this reduction is to demonstrate that
Eve’s view in the original EPP picture can be made to be exactly the same
as in BB84. Therefore, the fact that Alice and Bob could have executed
their QKD with quantum computers is sufficient to guarantee the security
of QKD. They do not actually need quantum computers in the actual exe-
cution. Another way to saying what is going on is that Alice and Bob are
allowed to throw away the phase error syndrome information without weak-
ening security. By throwing such phase error syndrome away, the scheme
becomes implementable with only classical computers, and, therefore, does
not require quantum computers.
3.6 Acceptable error rate
If one only aims to decode noise patterns up to half of the minimal distance d
(as in much of conventional coding theory), then, given that above quantum
code uses C1 and C
⊥
2 that have large minimal distances, it achieves the
quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes[15, 57]. As the length
of the code, n goes to infinity, the number of encoded qubits goes to [1 −
2H(2e)]n, where e is the measured bit error rate in the quantum transmission.
Here, the factor of 2 in front of H arises because one has to deal with both
phase and bit-flip errors in a quantum code. In the classical analog, the
factor of 2 in front of H does not appear. (The factor of 2 inside H ensures
that the distance between any two codewords is at least twice of the tolerable
error rate.)
However, in fact, the same CSS code can decode, with vanishing probabil-
ity of error, up to twice of the above error rate. That is to say, it can achieve
the quantum Shannon bound for non-degenerate codes. Asymptotically, the
number of encoded qubits goes to [1−2H(e)]n. The maximal tolerable error
rate would be about 11%.
The reason for the improvement is that the code only needs to correct
the likely errors, rather than all possible errors at such a noise level. We
remark that this is highly reminiscent of a result in classical coding theory
which states that Gallager codes, which are based on very low density parity
check matrices, can achieve the Shannon bound in classical coding theory[47].
In the classical case, the intuition is that in a very high-dimensional binary
space, while two spheres of radius r whose centers are a distance d apart have
a non-zero volume of intersection for any r greater than d/2, the fractional
overlap is vanishingly small provided that r < d.
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To achieve the Shannon bound in the quantum code case, it is necessary
to ensure that the errors are randomly distributed among the n qubits. As
noted by Shor and Preskill, this can be done by, for example, permuting the
n qubits randomly.
Remark 5: In the original Mayers’ proof, the maximal tolerable error rate
is about 7%. As noted by Shor and Preskill, Mayers’ proof has a hidden
CSS code structure. Mayers considered some (efficiently decodable) classical
codes, C1, and a random subcode, C2, of C1. It turns out that, the dual,
C⊥2 , of a random subcode of C1 is highly likely to be a good code. However,
Mayers’ proof considered the correction of all phase errors, rather than likely
phase errors within the error rate. For this reason, as the length, n, of
the codeword goes to infinity, the number of encoded qubits asymptotically
approaches [1−H(e)−H(2e)]n, the first H comes from error correction and
the second comes from privacy amplification. Thus, key generation is possible
only up to 7%. Shor and Preskill extended Mayers’ proof by noting that it is
necessary to correct only likely phase errors, but not all phase errors within
the error rate. They also randomize the errors by adding the permutation
step mentioned in the above paragraphs.
3.7 Shor and Preskill’s protocol of BB84
In the last few subsections, we have already discussed the main steps of Shor
and Preskill’s proof. For completeness, we will list here all the steps of Shor
and Preskill’s protocol of BB84 scheme.
(1) Alice sends a sequence of say (4 + δ1)n, where δ1 is a small positive
number, photons each in one of the four polarizations (horizontal, vertical,
45 degrees and 135 degrees) chosen randomly and independently.
(2) For each photon, Bob chooses the type of measurement randomly:
along either the rectilinear or diagonal bases.
(3) Bob records his measurement bases and the results of the measure-
ments.
(4) Subsequently, Bob announces his bases (but not the results) through
the public unjammable channel that he shares with Alice.
Remark 6: Notice that it is crucial that Bob announces his basis only
after his measurement. This ensures that during the transmission of the
signals through the quantum channel the eavesdropper Eve does not know
which basis to eavesdrop along. Otherwise, Eve can avoid detection simply
by measuring along the same basis used by Bob.
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(5) Alice tells Bob which of his measurements have been done in the
correct bases.
(6) Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into two classes de-
pending on whether they have used the same basis or not.
Remark 7: Notice that on average, Bob should have performed the wrong
type of measurements on half of the photons. Here, by a wrong type of
measurement we mean that Bob has used a basis different from that of Alice.
For those photons, he gets random outcomes. Therefore, he throws away
those polarization data. We emphasize that this immediately implies that
half of the data are thrown away and the efficiency of BB84 is bounded by
50%.
With high probability, at least ≈ 2n photons are left. (If not, they abort.)
Assuming that no eavesdropping has occurred, all the photons that are mea-
sured by Bob in the correct bases should give the same polarizations as
prepared by Alice. Besides, Bob can determine those polarizations by his
own detectors without any communications from Alice. Therefore, those
polarization data are a candidate for their raw key. However, before they
proceed any further, it is crucial that they test for tampering. For instance,
they can use the following simplified method for estimating the error rate.
(Going through BB84 would give us essentially the same result, namely that
all accepted data are lumped together to compute a single error rate.)
(7) Alice and Bob randomly pick a subset of photons from those that
are measured in the correct bases and publicly compare their polarization
data for preparation and measurement. For instance, they can use ≈ n
photons for such testing. For those results, they estimate the error rate for
the transmission. Of course, since the polarization data of photons in this
subset have been announced, Alice and Bob must sacrifice those data to avoid
information leakage to Eve.
We assume that Alice and Bob have some idea on the channel charac-
teristics. If the average error rate e¯ turns out to be unreasonably large (i.e.,
e¯ ≥ emax where emax is the maximal tolerable error rate), then either substan-
tial eavesdropping has occurred or the channel is somehow unusually noisy.
In both cases, all the data are discarded and Alice and Bob may re-start the
whole procedure again. Notice that, even then there is no loss in security be-
cause the compromised key is never used to encipher sensitive data. Indeed,
Alice and Bob will derive a key from the data only when the security of the
polarization data is first established.
On the other hand, if the error rate turns out to be reasonably small (i.e.,
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e¯ < emax), they go to the next step.
(8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob can indepen-
dently convert the polarizations of the remaining n photons into a raw key
by, for example, regarding a horizontal or 45-degree photon as denoting a ‘0’
and a vertical or 135-degree photon a ‘1’.
Alice and Bob pick a CSS code based on two classical binary codes, C1 and
C2, as in Eqs. (17) and (18), such that both C1 and C
⊥
2 , the dual of C2, correct
up to t errors where t is chosen such that the following procedure of error
correction and privacy amplification will succeed with a high probability.
(8.1) Let v be Alice’s string of the remaining n unchecked bits.
Alice picks a random codeword u ∈ C1 and publicly announces u+ v.
(8.2) Let v + ∆ be Bob’s string of the remaining n unchecked bits. (It
differs from Alice’s string due to the presence of errors ∆.) Bob subtracts
Alice’s announced string u + v from his own string to obtain u + ∆, which
is a corrupted version of u. Using the error correcting property of C1, Bob
recovers a codeword, u, in C1.
(8.3) Alice and Bob use the coset of u+ C2 as their key.
Remark 8: As noted before, there is a minor subtlety [55]. To tolerate a
higher channel error rate of up to about 11%, Alice should apply a random
permutation to the qubits before their transmission to Bob. Bob should then
apply the inverse permutation before decoding.
Remark 9: Depending on the desired security level, the number of test
photons in Step (7) can be made to be much smaller than n. If one takes
the limit that the probability that Eve can break the system is fixed but
arbitrary, then the number of test photons can be made to be of order logn
only. On the other hand, if the probability that Eve can break the system
is chosen to be exponentially small in n, then it is necessary to test order n
photons.
4 Overview of efficient BB84
In this section, we will give an overview of the efficient BB84 scheme and
provide a sketch of a simple proof of its security.
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4.1 bias
The first major new ingredient of our efficient BB84 scheme is to put a bias
in the probabilities of choosing between the two bases.
Recall the fraction of rejected data of BB84 is likely to be at least 50%.
This is because in BB84 Alice and Bob choose between the two bases ran-
domly and independently. Consequently, on average Bob performs a wrong
type of measurement half of the time and, therefore, half of the photons are
thrown away immediately. The efficiency will be increased if Alice prepares
and Bob measures their photons with a biased choice of basis. Specifically,
they first agree on a fixed number 0 < p ≤ 1/2. Alice prepares (Bob mea-
sures) each photon randomly, independently in the rectilinear and diagonal
basis with probabilities p and 1− p respectively. Clearly, the scheme is inse-
cure when p = 0. Nonetheless, we shall show that in the limit of large number
of photon transfer, this biased scheme is secure in the limit of p→ 0+. Hence,
the efficiency of this biased scheme is asymptotically doubled when compared
to BB84.
Notice also that the bias in the probabilities might be produced passively
by an apparatus, for example, an unbalanced beamsplitter in Bob’s side.
Such a passive implementation based on a beamsplitter eliminates the need
for fast switching between different polarization bases and is, thus, useful in
experiments. This may not be obvious to the readers why a beamsplitter can
create a probabilistic implementation. If one uses a beamsplitter, rather than
a fast switch, one gets a superposition of states and not a mixture. How-
ever, provided that the subsequent measurement operators annihilate any
state transmitting in one of the two paths, the probabilities of the outcomes
will be the same for either a mixture or a superposition. More concretely,
suppose one can model the problem by decomposing the Hilbert space into
two subspaces H = H1⊕H2 where H1 is the Hilbert subspace corresponding
to the first path and H2 the second respectively. Consider the two sets of
measurement operators, {Pi}’s and {Qj}’s respectively, where Pi|ψ〉 = 0 for
all |ψ〉 ∈ H2 and Qj |ψ〉 = 0 for all |ψ〉 ∈ H1. Let us write |u〉 = |u1〉 + |u2〉
where |u1〉 ∈ H1 and |u2〉 ∈ H2.
Now, the probability of the outcome corresponding to the measurement
Pi is given by
|〈u|Pi|u〉| = |〈u1|Pi|u1〉| (23)
and the probability of the outcome corresponding to the measurement Qj is
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given by
|〈u|Qj|u〉| = |〈u2|Qj|u2〉|. (24)
Those probabilities are exactly the same as those given by a mixture of |u1〉
and |u2〉.
4.2 Refined Error Analysis
In the original BB84 scheme, all the accepted data (those for which Alice and
Bob measure along the same basis) are lumped together to compute a single
error rate. In this subsection, we introduce the second major ingredient of our
scheme — a refined error analysis. The idea is for Alice and Bob to divide up
the accepted data into two subsets according to the actual basis (rectilinear
or diagonal) used. After that, a random subset of photons is drawn from
each of the two sets. They then publicly compare their polarization data and
from there estimate the error rate for each basis separately. They decide that
the run is acceptable if and only if both error rates are sufficiently small.
The requirement of having estimated error rates separately in both bases
to be small is more stringent that the original one. In fact, if a naive data
analysis, where only a single error rate is computed by Alice and Bob, had
been employed, our new scheme would have been insecure. To understand
this point, consider the following example of a so-called biased eavesdropping
strategy by Eve.
For each photon, Eve 1) with a probability p1 measures its polarization
along the rectilinear basis and resends the result of her measurement to Bob;
2) with a probability p2 measures its polarization along the diagonal basis
and resends the result of her measurement to Bob; and 3) with a probability
1− p1 − p2, does nothing. We remark that, by varying the values of p1 and
p2, Eve has a whole class of eavesdropping strategies. Let us call any of the
strategies in this class a biased eavesdropping attack.
Consider the error rate e1 for the case when both Alice and Bob use
the rectilinear basis. For the biased eavesdropping strategy under current
consideration, errors occur only if Eve uses the diagonal basis. This happens
with a conditional probability p2. In this case, the polarization of the photon
is randomized, thus giving an error rate e1 = p2/2. Similarly, errors for the
diagonal basis occur only if Eve is measuring along the rectilinear basis. This
happens with a conditional probability p1 and when it happens, the photon
polarization is randomized. Hence, the error rate for the diagonal basis
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e2 = p1/2. Therefore, Alice and Bob will find, for the biased eavesdropping
attack, that the average error rate
e¯ =
p2e1 + (1− p)
2e2
p2 + (1− p)2
=
p2p2 + (1− p)
2p1
2[p2 + (1− p)2]
. (25)
Suppose Eve always eavesdrops solely along the diagonal basis (i.e., p1 = 0
and p2 = 1), then
e¯ =
p2
2[p2 + (1− p)2]
→ 0 (26)
as p tends to 0. Hence, with the original error estimation method in BB84,
Alice and Bob will fail to detect eavesdropping by Eve. Yet, Eve will have
much information about Alice and Bob’s raw key as she is always eavesdrop-
ping along the dominant (diagonal) basis. Hence, a naive error analysis fails
miserably.
In contrast, the refined error analysis can make our scheme secure against
such a biased eavesdropping attack. Recall that in a refined error analysis,
the two error rates are computed separately. The key observation is that these
two error rates e1 = p2/2 and e2 = p1/2 depend only on Eve’s eavesdropping
strategy, but not on the value of ε. This is so because they are conditional
probabilities. Consequently, in the case that Eve is always eavesdropping
along the dominant (i.e., diagonal) basis, Alice and Bob will find an error
rate of e1 = p2/2 = 1/2 for the rectilinear basis. Since 1/2 is substantially
larger than emax, Alice and Bob will successfully catch Eve.
4.3 Procedure of efficient QKD
We now give the complete procedure of an efficient QKD scheme. Its security
will be discussed in Subsection 4.4 and more details of a proof of its security
will be given in Section 5.
Protocol E: Protocol for efficient QKD
(1) Alice and Bob pick a number 0 < p ≤ 1/2 whose value is made public.
Let N be a large integer. Alice sends a sequence of N photons to Bob. For
each photon Alice chooses between the two bases, rectilinear and diagonal,
with probabilities p and 1− p respectively. The value of p is chosen so that
N(p2− δ′) = m1 = Ω(logN), where δ′ is some small positive number and m1
is the number of test photons in the rectilinear basis in Step (7).
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(2) Bob measures the polarization of each received photon independently
along the rectilinear and diagonal bases with probabilities p and 1 − p re-
spectively.
(3) Bob records his measurement bases and the results of the measure-
ments.
(4) Bob announces his bases (but not the results) through the public
unjammable channel that he shares with Alice.
(5) Alice tells Bob which of his measurements have been done in the
correct bases.
(6) Recall that each of Alice and Bob uses one of the two bases — rec-
tilinear and diagonal. Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into
four cases according to the actual bases used. They then throw away the two
cases when they have used different bases. The remaining two cases are kept
for further analysis.
(7) From the subset where they both use the rectilinear basis, Alice and
Bob randomly pick a fixed number say m1 photons and publicly compare
their polarizations. (Since N(p2 − δ′) = m1, for a large N , it is highly likely
that at least m1 photons are transmitted and received in the rectilinear basis.
If not, they abort.) The number of mismatches r1 tells them the estimated
error rate e1 = r1/m1. Similarly, from the subset where they both use the
diagonal basis, Alice and Bob randomly pick a fixed number say m2 photons
and publicly compare their polarizations. The number of mismatches r2 gives
the estimated error rate e2 = r2/m2.
Provided that the test samples m1 and m2 are sufficiently large, the es-
timated error rates e1 and e2 should be rather accurate. As will be given in
Subsection 5.4, m1 and m2 should be at least of order Ω(log k), where k is
the length of the final key. Now they demand that e1, e2 < emax − δe where
emax is a prescribed maximal tolerable error rate and δe is some small positive
parameter. If these two independent constraints are satisfied, they proceed
to step (8). Otherwise, they throw away the polarization data and re-start
the whole procedure from step (1).
(8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: For simplicity, in what fol-
lows, we will take m1 = m2 = N(p
2 − δ′). Alice and Bob randomly pick
n = N [(1−p)2−p2−δ′] photons from those untested photons that are trans-
mitted and received in the diagonal basis. Alice and Bob then independently
convert the polarizations of those n photons into a raw key by, for example,
regarding a 45-degree photon as denoting a ‘0’ and a 135-degree photon a
‘1’.
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Remark 10: Note that the raw key is generated by measuring along a
single basis, namely the diagonal basis. This greatly simplifies the analysis
without compromising efficiency or security.
Alice and Bob pick a CSS code based on two classical binary codes, C1 and
C2, as in Eqs. (17) and (18), such that both C1 and C
⊥
2 , the dual of C2, correct
up to t errors where t is chosen such that the following procedure of error
correction and privacy amplification will succeed with a high probability.
(8.1) Let v be Alice’s string of the remaining n unchecked bits.
Alice picks a random codeword u ∈ C1 and publicly announces u+ v.
(8.2) Let v + ∆ be Bob’s string of the remaining n unchecked bits. (It
differs from Alice’s string due to the presence of errors ∆.) Bob subtracts
Alice’s announced string u + v from his own string to obtain u + ∆, which
is a corrupted version of u. Using the error correcting property of C1, Bob
recovers a codeword, u, in C1.
(8.3) Alice and Bob use the coset of u+ C2 as their key.
Remark 11: As noted before, there is a minor subtlety [55]. To tolerate a
higher channel error rate of up to about 11%, Alice should apply a random
permutation to the qubits before their transmission to Bob. Bob should then
apply the inverse permutation before decoding.
4.4 Outline proof of Security of efficient QKD scheme
In this subsection, we will give the general strategy of proving the uncondi-
tional security of efficient QKD scheme and discuss some subtleties. Some
loose ends will be tightened in Section 5.
First of all, we would like to derive the relationship between the error rates
in the two bases (X and Z) in biased BB84 and the bit-flip and phase error
rates in the underlying entanglement purification protocol (EPP). Actually,
this depends on how the key is generated. If the key is generated only from
polarization data in say the Z-basis, then clearly, the bit-flip error rate is
simply the Z-basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the X-
basis bit error rate. On the other hand, if the key is generated only from
polarization data in say the X-basis, then the bit-flip error rate is simply the
X-basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the Z-basis bit error
rate.
More generally, if a key is generated by making a fraction, q, of the
measurements along the Z-basis and a fraction, 1 − q, along the X-basis,
then the bit-flip and phase error rates are given by weighted averages of the
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bit error rates of the two bases:
ebit−flip = qe1 + (1− q)e2
ephase = qe1 + (1− q)e2, (27)
where e1 and e2 are the bit error rates of the Z and the X bases respectively.
Now, in a refined data analysis, Alice and Bob separate data from the two
bases into two sets and compute the error rates in the two sets individually.
This gives them individual estimates on the bit error rates, e1 and e2, of the
Z and X bases respectively. They demand that both error rates must be
sufficiently small, say,
0 ≤ e1, e2 < emax − δe. (28)
From Eqs. (27), we see that, provided that the bit error rates of the X
and Z bases are sufficiently small (such that Eqs. (28) are satisfied), we have
0 ≤ ebit−flip, ephase < 11%, (29)
which says that both bit-flip and phase-flip signal error rates of the under-
lying EPP are small enough to allow CSS code to correct. Therefore, Shor
and Preskill’s argument carries over directly to establish the security of our
efficient QKD scheme, if Alice and Bob apply a refined data analysis. This
completes our sketch of the proof of security.
We remark that the error correction and privacy amplification procedure
that we use are exactly the same as in Shor-Preskill’s proof. The point is
the following: Once the error rate for both the bit-flip and phase errors are
shown to be correctable by a quantum (CSS) code, the procedure for error
correction and privacy amplification in their proof can be carried over directly
to our new scheme.
4.5 practical issues
Several complications deserve attention. First, Alice and Bob only have
estimators of e1 and e2, the bit error rates of the two bases, from their
random sample. They need to establish confidence levels on the actual bit
error rates of the population (or more precisely, those of the untested signals)
from those estimators. Second, Alice and Bob are interested in the bit-flip
and phase error rates of the EPP, rather than the bit error rates of the two-
bases. Some conversion of the confidence levels has to be done. Given that
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the two bases are weighted differently, such a conversion looks non-trivial.
Third, Alice and Bob have to deal with finite sample and population sizes
whereas many statistics textbooks takes the limit of infinite population size.
Indeed, it is commonplace in statistics textbooks to take the limit of infinite
population size and, therefore, assume a normal distribution. Furthermore, in
practice, Alice and Bob are interested in bounds, not approximations (which
might over-estimate or under-estimate) which many statistics textbooks are
contented with.
Another issue: it is useful to specify the constraints on the bias param-
eter, q, and the size of the test samples, m1 and m2. Indeed, in order to
demonstrate the security of an efficient scheme for QKD, it is important to
show that the size of the test sample can be a very small fraction of the total
number of transmitted photons.
We shall present some basic constraints here. As will be shown in Sec-
tion 5, these basic constraints turn out to the most important ones. We see
from Remark 2 that, if one limits the eavesdropper’s information, Ieve, to
less than a small fixed amount, then, as the length, k, of the key increases,
the allowed infidelity in Theorem 2, δ, of the state must decrease at least as
O(1/k). Suppose m1 and m2 signals are tested for the two different bases re-
spectively, it is quite clear that δ is at least eO(mi). This leads to a constraint
that mi is at least Ω(log k).
10 Suppose N photons are transmitted and Alice
sends photons along the rectilinear and diagonal bases with probabilities, p
and 1 − p respectively. Then, the average number of particles available for
testing along the rectilinear basis is only Np2. Imposing that mi is no more
than order Np2, we obtain Np2 = Ω(log k).
5 Details of Proof of security of efficient QKD
We will now tighten some of the loose ends in the proof of unconditional
security of our efficient QKD protocol, Protocol E.
10Notice that this constraint is weaker than the usual constraint of mi = Ω(N) im-
posed by various other proofs[49, 10]. In the next section, we will see that it is, indeed,
unnecessary to impose mi = Ω(N).
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5.1 Using only one basis to generate the raw key
Recall that, in a refined data analysis, Alice and Bob separate data from
the two bases into two sets and compute the error rates in the two sets
individually. This gives them individual estimates on the bit error rates, e1
and e2, of the Z and X bases respectively. Alice and Bob demand that both
error rates must be sufficiently small, say,
0 ≤ e1, e2 < emax − δe, (30)
where δe is some small positive parameter. From the work of Shor-Preskill,
emax is about 11%.
We would like to derive the relationship between the error rates in the two
bases (X and Z) in biased BB84 and the bit-flip and phase error rates in the
underlying entanglement purification protocol (EPP). Actually, this depends
on how the key is generated. In our protocol E, the raw key is generated only
from polarization data in the X-basis (diagonal basis), the bit-flip error rate
is simply the X-basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the
Z-basis (rectilinear basis) bit error rate. Therefore, no non-trivial conversion
between the error rates of the two bases and the bit-flip and phase error
rates needs to be performed. This greatly simplifies our analysis without
compromising the efficiency nor security of the scheme.
Therefore, we have:
0 ≤ ephasesample, e
bit−flip
sample < emax − δe, (31)
where δe is some small positive parameter and emax is about 11%.
5.2 Using classical random sampling theory to estab-
lish confidence levels
A main point of Shor-Preskill’s proof is that the bit-flip and phase error rates
of the random sample provide good estimates of the population bit-flip and
phase error rates. Indeed, our refined data analysis, as presented in [43] and
earlier version of the current paper, has been employed by Gottesman and
Preskill [28] in their recapitulation of Shor and Preskill’s proof. Gottesman
and Preskill assumed that Alice and Bob generate the key by always measur-
ing along the Z-axis. We remark that the problem of establishing confidence
levels of the population from the data provided by a random sample is strictly
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a problem in classical random sampling theory because the relevant operators
all commute with each other. See subsection 3.3 for details.
It should be apparent that Gottesman-Preskill’s reformulation of Shor-
Preskill’s proof and its accompanying analysis of classical statistics carry over
to our efficient QKD scheme, provided that we employ the prescribed refined
data analysis.
Let us now give more details of the argument that the sample (bit-flip
and phase) error rates provide good estimates of the population (bit-flip and
phase) error rates. It is simpler to take the limit of N goes to infinity. In
this case, the classical de Finetti’s representation theorem applies [16]. The
de Finetti’s theorem states that the number, r1, of phase errors in the test
sample of m1 photons is given by:
p(r1, m1) =
(
m1
r1
)∫ 1
0
zr1(1− z)m1−r1P 1∞(z)dz (32)
for some ‘probability of probabilities’ (i.e., a non-negative function, P 1∞).
Physically, it means that one can imagine that each photon is generated
by some unknown independent, identical distribution that is chosen with a
probability, P 1∞(z).
Similarly, for the bit-flip errors, its number, r2, in the test sample of m2
photons is given by:
p(r2, m2) =
(
m2
r2
)∫ 1
0
zr2(1− z)m2−r2P 2∞(z)dz (33)
for some ‘probability of probabilities’, P 2∞(z)dz.
We are interested in the case of a finite population size, N . Fortunately,
a similar expression still exists[37, 51, 35] and it can be written in terms of
hypergeometric functions:
p(r2, m2) =
N−m2+r2∑
n=r2
[C(m2, r2)C(N −m2, n− r2)/C(N, n)]P (n,N) (34)
where C(a, b) is the number of ways of choosing b objects from a objects and
P (n,M) is the ‘probability of probabilities’.
An upper bound, which will be sufficient for our purposes, can be found
in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose one is given a population of ntotal balls out of which
pntotal of them are white and the rest are black. One then picks ntest balls
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randomly and uniformly from this population without replacement. Then,
the probability of getting at most ⌊λntest⌋ white balls, Prwr(X < ⌊λntest⌋),
satisfies the inequality
Prwr(X ≤ ⌊λntest⌋) < 2
−ntest{A(λ,p)−ntest/[(ntotal−ntest) ln 2]} (35)
provided that ntest > 1 and 0 ≤ λ < p, where
A(λ, p) = −H(λ)− λ log2 p− (1− λ) log2(1− p) (36)
with H(λ) ≡ −λ log2 λ − (1 − λ) log2(1 − λ) being the well-known binary
entropy function.
Furthermore, A(λ, p) ≥ 0 whenever 0 ≤ λ ≤ p < 1 and the equality holds
if and only if λ = p.
Proof: We denote the probability of getting exactly j white balls by
Prwr(X = j). Clearly,
Prwr(X = j)
=
(
ntest
j
)
(pntotal−j+1)j ([1− p]ntotal−ntest+j+1)ntest−j
(ntotal−ntest+1)ntest
, (37)
where (x)j ≡ x(x + 1)(x+ 2) · · · (x+ j − 1). Eq. (37) is called the hyperge-
ometric distribution whose properties have been studied in great detail. In
particular,
Sro´dka showed that [56]
Prwr(X = j) <
(
ntest
j
)
pj(1− p)ntest−j
(
1−
ntest
ntotal
)−ntest
×
[
1 +
6n2test + 6ntest − 1
12ntotal
]−1
<
(
ntest
j
)
pj(1− p)ntest−j
(
1−
ntest
ntotal
)−ntest
(38)
whenever ntest > 1.
Consequently,
Prwr(X ≤ ⌊λntest⌋) (39)
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<
(
1−
ntest
ntotal
)−ntest ⌊λntest⌋∑
j=0
(
ntest
j
)
pj(1− p)ntest−j (40)
<
(
1−
ntest
ntotal
)−ntest
2ntest[H(λ)+λ log2 p+(1−λ) log2(1−p)] (41)
< 2−ntest{−H(λ)−λ log2 p−(1−λ) log2(1−p)−ntest/[(ntotal−ntest) ln 2]} (42)
whenever 0 ≤ λ < p. Note that we have used the inequality in [52] to obtain
Eq. (41) and the inequality − x
1−x ≤ ln(1 − x) ≤ −x ≤ 0 to obtain Eq. (42)
respectively. Hence, Eq. (35) holds.
Finally we want to show that A(λ, p) ≥ 0 whenever 0 ≤ λ ≤ p < 1; and
the equality holds if and only if λ = p. This fact follows directly from the
observations that A(λ, λ) = 0, ∂A/∂p ≥ 0 whenever 0 ≤ λ ≤ p < 1 and the
equality holds if and only if λ = p. Q.E.D.
Note that Lemma 1 gives a precise bound, not just an approximation. The
upshot of Lemma 1 is that the probability that the sample mean deviates
from the population mean by any arbitrary but fixed non-zero amount can
be shown to be exponentially small in ntest, as discussed in subsection 4.5. In
effect, Lemma 1 gives the conditional probability, ε1, that the signal quality
check stage is passed, given that more than t ≡ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ out of the n pairs
of shared entangled particles between Alice and Bob are in error. We will
choose ntest = m1 = m2 in our Protocol E.
5.3 Bounding fidelity
Given any eavesdropping strategy that will pass the verification test with
a probability, ε2, it is important to obtain a bound on the fidelity of the
recovered state as k EPR pairs, after quantum error correction and quantum
privacy amplification. We have the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. (Adapted from [44]) Suppose Alice and Bob perform
a stabilizer-based EPP-based QKD and, for the verification test, randomly
sample along at least two of the three bases, X and Y and Z and compute
their error rates. Suppose further that the CSS code used in the signal
privacy amplification stage acts on n imperfect pairs of qubits to distill out
k pairs of qubits. Given any fixed but arbitrary eavesdropping strategy by
Eve, define the following probabilities:
p = P (EPP succeeds), (43)
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ε1 = P (verification passed |EPP fails), (44)
and
ε¯1 = P (verification failed |EPP succeeds), (45)
(In statistics language, ε1 and ε¯1 are the type I and II errors respectively.)
Then, for any Eve’s cheating strategy whose probability of passing the verifi-
cation test is greater than ε2, the fidelity of the remaining untested shared en-
tangled state immediately after the quantum privacy amplification is greater
than 1− ε1/ε2.
Proof: From Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, one can, indeed, apply clas-
sical arguments to the problem by assigning classical probabilities to the
N -Bell-basis states. Given any fixed but arbitrary eavesdropping strategy,
the fidelity of the remaining untested entangled state is given by:
F ≥
P (verification passed and EPP succeeds)
P (verification passed)
=
P (EPP succeeds)P (verification passed |EPP succeeds)
P (EPP succeeds)P (verification passed |EPP succeeds) + P (EPP fails)P (verification passed
=
P (EPP succeeds)P (verification passed |EPP succeeds)
P (EPP succeeds)P (verification passed |EPP succeeds) + P (EPP fails)P (verification passed
=
p(1− ε¯1)
p(1− ε¯1) + (1− p)ε1
≥ 1−
ε1
p(1− ε¯1) + (1− p)ε1
,
Now, for any Eve’s cheating strategy whose probability of passing the
verification test is greater than ε2, we have p(1 − ε¯1) + (1 − p)ε1 > ε2 and,
hence, from Eq. (46),
F > 1−
ε1
ε2
. (47)
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
5.4 Summary of the proof
We will now put all the pieces together and show that a rigorous proof of
security is possible with the number of test particles, m1 = m2 = ntest,
scaling logarithmically with the length k of the final key. Consequently, the
bias in an efficient BB84 scheme can be chosen such that N(p2 − δ′) = ntest
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for a small δ. In other words, p = O(
√
(log k)/N), which goes to zero as N
goes to infinity.
Given a signal quality check that involves only ntest photons, from
Lemma 1, we see that the conditional probability, ε1, that the signal qual-
ity check stage is passed, given that more than t ≡ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ out of the
n pairs of shared entangled particles between Alice and Bob are in error is
exponentially small in ntest. i.e.,
ε1 = O(2
−ntestα), (48)
for some positive constant α.
Let Alice and Bob pick a security parameter,
ε2 = 2
−u, (49)
and consider only eavesdropping strategies that will pass the signal quality
check with a probability at least ε2. We require that
ε =
ε1
ε2
≪ 1. (50)
Recall from Theorem 3 that for any eavesdropping strategy that will pass
the signal quality check test with a probability at least ε2, has its fidelity
bounded by 1− ε. i.e.,
F ≥ 1− ε. (51)
Now, from Theorem 2, the eavesdropper’s mutual information with the
final key is bounded by
IBoundeve = ε(2k + log2(1/ε) +
1
loge 2
). (52)
Consider a fixed but arbitrary value of IBoundeve , the constraint on the eaves-
dropper’s mutual information on the final key: i.e.,
IBoundeve = 2
−s, (53)
where s is a positive security parameter. In the large k limit, Eq. (52) implies
that
ε = O(2−s/k). (54)
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Substituting Eq. (50) into Eq. (54), we see that
kε1
2−sε2
= O(1). (55)
Substituting Eqs. (48) and (49) into Eq. (55), we find that
k2−ntestα
2−(u+s)
= O(1). (56)
Now, for fixed but arbitrary values of the security parameters, s and u,
we see that, in fact, the number of test photons, ntest, is required to scale
only as O(log k), i.e., the logarithm of the final key length. Consequently, the
only constraint on the bias p is that there are enough photons for performing
the verification test. This gives rise to the requirement that N(p2 − δ′) =
ntest = O(log k), i.e.,
p = O(
√
(log k)/N). (57)
This completes our proof of security of Protocol E, an efficient QKD
scheme. We remark that the error correction and privacy amplification pro-
cedure in Protocol E are exactly the same as in Shor-Preskill’s proof.
As a side remark, if one insists that the eavesdropper’s information is
exponentially small in N , then one can take s = cN , for some positive
constant, c. From Eq. (56), this will require ntest to be proportional to N . A
number of earlier papers make such an assumption. However, in this paper,
we note that this requirement can be relaxed. For instance, it is consistent
to pick s = cNa
′
where 0 ≤ a′ ≤ 1. In this more general case, we have from
Eq. (56) that asymptotically αntest ∼ cN
a′ . Consequently,
αNp2 ≥ αntest ∼ cN
a′
p2 = Ω(
cNa
′−1
α
). (58)
From Eq. (58), it is clear that for all values of a′ ∈ [0, 1], the probability
p can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, but non-zero. This completes our
analysis for the security of an efficient QKD scheme where each of Alice and
Bob picks the two polarization bases with probabilities p and 1− p.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a new quantum key distribution scheme and
proved its unconditional security against the most general attacks allowed
by quantum mechanics.
In BB84, each of Alice and Bob chooses between the two bases (rectilin-
ear and diagonal) with equal probability. Consequently, Bob’s measurement
basis differs from that of Alice’s half of the time. For this reason, half of the
polarization data are useless and are thus thrown away immediately. We have
presented a simple modification that can essentially double the efficiency of
BB84. There are two important ingredients in this modification. The first
ingredient is for each of Alice and Bob to assign significantly different prob-
abilities (say ε and 1− ε respectively where ε is small but non-zero) to the
two polarization bases (rectilinear and diagonal respectively). Consequently,
they are much more likely to use the same basis. This decisively enhances
efficiency.
However, an eavesdropper may try to break such a scheme by eavesdrop-
ping mainly along the predominant basis. To make the scheme secure against
such a biased eavesdropping attack, it is crucial to have the second ingredient
— a refined error analysis — in place. The idea is the following. Instead
of lumping all the accepted polarization data into one set and computing a
single error rate (as in BB84), we divide up the data into various subsets
according to the actual polarization bases used by Alice and Bob. In partic-
ular, the two error rates for the cases 1) when both Alice and Bob use the
rectilinear basis and 2) when both Alice and Bob use the diagonal basis, are
computed separately. It is only when both error rates are small that they
accept the security of the transmission.
We then prove the security of efficient QKD scheme, not only against the
specific attack mentioned above, but also against the most general attacks
allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. In other words, our new scheme
is unconditionally secure. Moreover, just like the standard BB84 scheme, our
protocol can be implemented without a quantum computer. The maximal
tolerable bit error rate is 11%, the same as in Shor and Preskill’s proof. If we
allow Eve to get a fixed but arbitrarily small amount of information on the
final key, then the number of test particles, ntest, is required only to scale log-
arithmically with the length k of the final key. Consequently, the bias in an
efficient BB84 scheme can be chosen such that N(p2 − δ′) = ntest for a small
δ and where N is the total number of photons transmitted. In other words,
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p = O(
√
(log k)/N), which goes to zero as N goes to infinity. More gener-
ally, suppose we pick the security parameter to be s (for an eavesdropper’s
information Ieve ≤ 2
−s) such that s = cNa
′
where 0 ≤ a′ ≤ 1. We find that
this can be achieved by testing ntest random photons where αntest ∼ cN
a′ .
Furthermore, each of Alice and Bob may pick the two polarization bases with
probabilities p and 1− p such that p2 = Ω( cN
a
′
−1
α
). Therefore, p can, indeed,
be made arbitrarily small but non-zero.
This is the first time that a single-particle quantum key distribution
scheme has been proven to be secure without relying on a symmetry ar-
gument — that the two bases are chosen randomly and uniformly. Our proof
is a generalization of Shor and Preskill’s proof [55] of security of BB84, a
proof that in turn built on earlier proofs by Lo and Chau [44] and also by
Mayers [49].
We remark that our idea of efficient schemes of quantum key distribution
applies also to other schemes such as Biham, Huttner and Mor’s scheme [11]
which is based on quantum memories. Our idea also applies the six-state
scheme [13], which has been shown rigorously to tolerate a higher error rate
of up to 12.7% [40].
As a side remark, Alice and Bob may use different biases in their choices
of probabilities. In other words, our idea still works if Alice chooses between
the two bases with probabilities ε and 1−ε and Bob chooses with probabilities
ε′ and 1− ε′ where ε 6= ε′.
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Notes Added: An entanglement-based scheme with an efficiency greater than
50% has also been discussed in a recent preprint by two of us (H.-K. Lo and
H.F. Chau) [44]. Recent proofs of the unconditional security of various QKD
schemes have been provided by H. Inamori [31, 32], H. Aschauer and H. J.
Briegel [1] and by D. Gottesman and J. Preskill [28]. Recently, it has been
shown [26] by D. Gottesman and one of us (H.-K. Lo) that two-way classical
communications can be used to increase substantially the maximal tolerable
bit error rate in BB84 and the six-state scheme. The result presented in the
current paper can be combined with [26] to obtain, for example, an efficient
BB84 scheme that can tolerate a substantially higher bit error rate (say,
18.9 percent) than in Shor-Preskill’s proof. It has been shown in a recent
preprint [27] that even imperfect devices can provide perfect security in QKD
within the entanglement purification approach employed in the present paper.
Finally, a proof of the unconditional security of another well-known QKD
scheme, B92 scheme published by Bennett in 1992 [2], has recently been
presented [58].
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